Judicial Review for the Public Lands: Comment to Eric Biber by Hsu, Shi-Ling
Florida State University College of Law
Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Publications
Spring 2017
Judicial Review for the Public Lands: Comment to
Eric Biber
Shi-Ling Hsu
Florida State University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Land Use Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Publications by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shi-Ling Hsu, Judicial Review for the Public Lands: Comment to Eric Biber, 32 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 375 (2017),
Available at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/486
375 
JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR THE PUBLIC LANDS:  
COMMENT TO ERIC BIBER 
 
SHI-LING HSU 
 
Eric Biber’s contribution to this Environmental Law Without 
Courts Symposium is, as he always is, insightful and lucid. His  
observations on how judicial review directly and indirectly affect  
administrative agency practices get to the crux of why we organized 
this symposium at Florida State—understanding those things  
that happen inside of administrative agencies and outside of judicial  
review. The applicability of this phenomenon to public lands man-
agement is especially instructive because of the nature of those  
industries that lease federal public lands. As it turns out, the  
prospect of judicial review—as well as the lack thereof—casts a long 
shadow indeed on the practices of administrative agencies manag-
ing federal public lands. 
Biber’s article reviews two ways in which case law has  
limited the scope and intrusiveness of judicial review: (i) requiring 
judicial challenges to address specific agency actions, rather than 
broader programmatic ones, and rather than agency inactions, and  
(ii) imposing barriers in the form of standing requirements for  
plaintiffs. Biber is doubtful that these limits systematically discrim-
inate against environmental organizations as plaintiffs, as there  
are a number of structural reasons that better explain the fact that 
environmental organizations are more commonly plaintiffs and, 
therefore, more frequently losers in litigation. It thus seems more 
appropriate to consider, as Biber does, the long-term implications  
of the relevant case law and the trends therein. What indeed, as 
Biber asks, “is the potential over the next ten to twenty years for the 
role of courts vis-à-vis land management agencies to change?”1 
The potential is great. It is hard to forecast, as the relationship 
between courts and federal land management agencies surely  
depends to some extent on political, geopolitical, and ecological  
conditions that seem increasingly chaotic these days. While the  
judiciary is obviously not an explicitly political body, it would be  
naïve to think that, at least from a descriptive point of view, judges 
would truly stand by and let Rome burn. The seemingly accelerating 
effects of climate change, the election of President Donald Trump, 
and the volatile and shifting allegiances among nations all have the 
                                                                                                                   
  D'Alemberte Professor and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs, Florida 
State University College of Law. 
1. Eric Biber, Looking Toward the Future of Judicial Review for the Public Lands,  
32 J. OF LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 359, 360 (2017). 
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potential to affect the way that the American judiciary views its role 
in an American democracy—if it in fact remains a democracy. 
I have two comments on Biber’s contribution, neither of which is 
a direct challenge, except insofar as to suggest that his summary of 
the case law might be subject to change in a dramatically climate-
changed world, an emerging authoritarian dystopia, or a radically 
different world order. If anything, I hope Biber, as a leading theo-
retical and practicing scholar of public land management, would 
take these comments as an invitation to take a more normative tone 
in his work in this area. 
My first comment is that it is troubling that courts have shied 
away from review of programmatic agency decisions. One can  
readily understand the administrative law tradition of leaving  
agencies to freely make the larger, technically difficult policy deci-
sions without the threat of litigation. It also makes more sense  
jurisprudentially, as courts should only be adjudicating choate  
actions and injuries, not grand plans and vague harms. But it may 
be just as important, and perhaps more important, for courts to have 
an oversight role because programmatic decisions play a very large 
role in shaping broad patterns of capital investment, much more  
so than the day-to-day decisions that courts seem more willing to 
review. The Northern Great Plains Resources Program2 helped 
usher in an era of unprecedented mineral exploitation, one that  
continues to reshape the landscape decades after its initiation.  
The low sulfur content of this Western coal,3 less environmentally 
harmful than that mined in the Midwestern and Appalachian U.S., 
coupled with the Clean Air Act sulfur dioxide emissions trading  
program, led to an explosion of mining activity that has reshaped 
the economies of the Northern Great Plains states.4 As we all know, 
the twilight of this era of coal mining has been brought about not by 
regulation or by recognition of the social costs of coal combustion, 
but by the emergence of cheap natural gas by hydraulic fracturing, 
which has itself become a transformative industry. 
There is a certain path-dependence to the development of  
fossil fuel industries, which tend to be highly capital-intensive.  
Programmatic decisions establish the conditions under which  
large amounts of capital are mobilized. Once mobilized, the owners 
of this capital yearn to deploy it, repeatedly and broadly. What  
was the effect of the Northern Great Plains Resource Program?  
                                                                                                                   
2. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ROCKY MOUNTAIN-PRAIRIE REGION, NORTHER GREAT 
PLAINS RESOURCES PROGRAM, ACCOMPLISHMENT PLAN (1974). 
3. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. COAL RESERVES: AN UPDATE BY 
HEAT AND SULFUR CONTENT ix-xi (1993). 
4. Daniel J. Daly, Coal, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE GREAT PLAINS, http://plainshumani-
ties.unl.edu/encyclopedia/doc/egp.ind.014 (last visited Apr. 2, 2017). 
Spring, 2017] PUBLIC LANDS COMMENT 377 
It was the large-scale development of fossil extraction resources 
with massive amounts of capital investment. Conservatively, pro-
ducing the roughly 400 million tons of coal from the Powder River 
Basin5 requires a capital outlay of $5.4 billion as a start-up cost  
for a mine that would last about thirty years.6 This kind of money 
will not be easily stranded. The stakes for programmatic decisions 
are thus much greater than those deemed to be “specific” agency 
actions, those more susceptible of judicial challenge. 
Why does capital-intensity in fossil fuel industries create  
such path-dependency? The answer is a political-economic one.  
Expensive capital investments create their own political economies. 
Making money extracting fossil fuels is a volume business, depend-
ent upon the freedom to operate expensive pieces of machinery  
for extended periods of time to extract amounts of fossil fuel of  
low value relative to the machinery. Fossil fuel extraction is only 
profitable when it can deploy large amounts of expensive capital for 
long periods of time without interruption from pesky regulators. 
One obvious answer to my argument is that if there are social 
costs or environmental externalities associated with operating this 
expensive capital, we have environmental laws, tort laws, and other 
public laws that serve to internalize externalities. Private capital 
investors run the risk of running afoul of these public laws should 
their capital be deemed in the future to impose social costs. 
How well has that model of ex post regulation worked out?  
Heroically, perhaps, but insufficiently. The reality is, especially 
given the political structure that favors Western extraction  
interests, that a capital investment in fossil fuel extraction is a  
commitment of resources that is irreversible. Politically speaking, 
capital investments in fossil fuel extraction are too big to fail.7  
What is sorely needed is some sobriety before huge amounts of  
private capital are committed to some socially risky venture. 
 
                                                                                                                   
5. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL COAL REPORT 2015  
3 tbl.1 (2016), http://www.eia.gov/coal/annual/pdf/acr.pdf. 
6. The startup capital cost of a typical 5,000 tonnes/day (about 5,500 tons/day) surface 
coal mine is approximately $19 million, exclusive of transportation and processing. InfoMine, 
Mining Cost Models, 5,000 Tonne per Day Open Pit Mine Model, COSTMINE, http://costs.in-
fomine.com/costdatacenter/miningcostmodel.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2017). The cost model 
assumes a very low stripping ratio, or amount of soil to be removed from above a mined  
resource, and it is likely that larger mines would have larger capital costs. 
7. See generally Juliet Eilperin, Steven Mufson & Philip Rucker, The oil and gas  
industry is quickly amassing power in Trump’s Washington, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-oil-and-gas-industry-is-quickly-amassing-
power-in-trumps-washington/2016/12/14/0d4b26e2-c21c-11e6-9578-
0054287507db_story.html?utm_term=.5a0efefcc6c5.  
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The “Keep it in the Ground” movement, a push to unilaterally 
terminate mineral leasing on federal lands altogether,8 would seem 
to be a programmatic decision. But the key difference between  
the “Keep it in the Ground” movement and a programmatic decision 
to lease is the option value of not leasing. Everyone can see the  
ecological irreversibility in leasing: once coal, oil, or gas is extracted, 
there is no putting it back. Reabsorption of combusted carbon  
dioxide takes place on geologic time scales that are irrelevant to  
humankind. By contrast, leaving it in the ground preserves the  
option of extraction and combustion at a later date. 
But in addition to this irreversibility, we generally overlook  
another one that pertains not to extraction, but to the capital  
investment. Once a programmatic decision to lease is made, vast 
sums of money are spent to extract fossil fuels; invested as they  
are in equipment that is very specific to the task of extracting  
fossil fuels, this money cannot be unspent. Leaving it in the ground 
retains the option value of later investing the money. Going  
slowly always seems to be a sensible idea when confronted with  
uncertainties. Unfortunately, the scale economy business of fossil 
fuel extraction works best not when going slowly, but when  
going full bore. 
This leads me to my second comment, one that is not addressed 
by Biber’s article: the increased importance of National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) review and the need for courts to  
undertake a more searching review of projects that involve an  
“irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources.”9 Again,  
irreversibility is considered in ecological terms. In the Bureau  
of Land Management’s (BLM) Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) for the Overland Pass Pipeline Project, the BLM writes, on the 
subject of irreversible/irretrievable commitments: 
 
An irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources  
refers to impacts on or losses to resources that cannot  
be recovered or reversed. Examples include permanent  
conversion of wetlands, or loss of cultural resources, soils, 
wildlife, agricultural, and socioeconomic conditions. The 
losses are permanent. Irreversible is a term that describes 
the loss of future options. It applies primarily to the effects 
of use of nonrenewable resources, such as minerals or  
cultural resources, or to those factors, such as soil productiv-
ity, that are renewable only over long periods of time. . . .  
                                                                                                                   
8. See Biber, supra note 1, at 360 n.5. 
9. National Environmental Policy Act, § 102(C)(v), (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(v) 
(1970). 
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The monetary investment by Overland Pass is not considered 
to be an irreversible or irretrievable commitment of  
resources. If this project was not built, the investment  
that would have otherwise been spent on these projects  
could be spent elsewhere.10  
 
Similarly, the Final Programmatic EIS for the 2012-2017 Outer 
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program provides that “the 
consumption of fuels during exploration, construction, production, 
and decommissioning would represent an irreversible and irretriev-
able commitment. The offshore oil and natural gas resources  
recovered as a result of the proposed action would be irretrievable 
once they are consumed.”11 The Programmatic EIS goes on to state 
that biological resources may, of course, also be irreversibly or  
irretrievably committed before an EIS, in contravention of NEPA.12 
My argument is that this is an insufficient way of looking at  
irreversibility. Monetary investments are irreversible to some  
extent, just because of the politics of large expenditures of money. 
The fiction that large private expenditures are solely the business 
of the private investors is the exact reason why economic invest-
ments should be a legitimate source of inquiry in reviewing  
programmatic decisions under NEPA. 
This might seem an odd line of inquiry to take under NEPA,  
or for a reviewing court to undertake, since courts don’t typically 
engage in economic analysis in reviewing agency decisions. But how 
is that different from engaging in the ecological analysis required of 
courts under NEPA? Are judges any less expert in economic matters 
than they are in ecological ones? 
The whole point of NEPA is to be proactive. NEPA requires that 
agencies evaluate the cumulative impact of “reasonably foreseeable 
future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) 
or person undertakes such other actions,”13 and to include “similar 
actions, which when viewed with other reasonably foreseeable or 
proposed agency actions, have similarities that provide a basis  
                                                                                                                   
10. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., OVERLAND PASS NATURAL GAS 
LIQUIDS PIPELINE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 7-1 (2007) (emphasis added). 
11. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., OUTER CONTINENTAL 
SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM: 2012-2017: FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT 7-1 (2012), https://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_ 
Energy_Program/Leasing/Five_Year_Program/2012-2017_Five_Year_Program/07_Irreversi-
ble.pdf. 
12. Id. at 7-2. 
13. 42 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2012); Summary of the National Environmental Policy Act, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-national-environ-
mental-policy-act (last visited Apr. 2, 2017) (“NEPA's basic policy is to assure that all 
branches of government give proper consideration to the environment prior to undertaking 
any major federal action that significantly affects the environment.”). 
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for evaluating their environmental consequences together . . . .”14  
So why would reviewing agencies not consider the reasonably  
foreseeable private capital decisions made by private investors?  
Certainly, the behavior of the fossil fuel industries is predictable. 
Making some fairly obvious suppositions should not be outside  
of the realm of inquiry for agencies, nor for courts. 
Legal rules and institutions seem to embody an idea that capital 
investment is an unalloyed good. Government policy should take 
great pains to avoid interfering with the long-term operation of  
capital, lest it discourage investment and unwittingly tamp down 
economic activity and growth. If there are any latent or future  
negative externalities associated with the operation of that capital, 
that is a public law matter; we leave that to the business of environ-
mental law, tort law, or whatever body of law it is that might  
address the externality. One thing that agencies can and should do 
is undertake a more searching inquiry into some fairly predictable 
actions that might be undertaken by private investors in light of 
their land use management decisions, even programmatic ones.  
To be sure, this would not initially be environmental law “without 
courts.” But if the point of this conference is to highlight some 
agency practices that might thrive without judicial supervision, 
then this is one conceptual step that seems worth contemplating. 
                                                                                                                   
14. Id. § 1508.25(a)(3). 
